Elisabet Titik Murtisari

A Relevance-based Framework for Explicitation and Implicitation in Translation
An Alternative Typology

Abstract
This paper proposes an alternative typology to explain explicitation and implicitation in translation using Relevance Theory’s concepts of “explicature” and “implicature”. Explicitation is defined as a shift of meaning from the implicit to the explicit or to a higher degree of explicitness. The term “implication”, on the other hand, is replaced by the term “de-explicitation”. This term refers to shifts of meaning from the explicit to implicit or to a lower degree of explicitness. This classification is further categorized into “scalar” and “categorical” explicitation/de-explicitation, which are derived from Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995: 182) classificatory and comparative nature of explicitness. Scalar shifts refer to shifts of explicitation/de-explicitation that take place within explicatures, while categorical shifts refer to shifts from an implicature to an explicature; or vice versa.

1 Introduction
“Explicitation” has been generally defined as the shift in translation that makes what is implicit in the source text explicit in the target text. “Implicitation”, on the other hand, is seen to consist of making what is explicit in the source language implicit in the target language. The notions of “explicit” and “implicit” are thus central in understanding the terms of explicitation and implicitation. In spite of this, however, there seems to be a strong tendency to overlook them in describing explicitation and implicitation. Consequently, scholars have different interpretations of the phenomena. As Kamenická points out, while “explicitation is spoken about as if reference were being made to the same set of phenomena”, “the opposite is true” (Kamenická 2007: 45). As a result, studies on the phenomena are difficult to compare. Becher (2010) even suggests that the conceptual vagueness affects the validity of explicitation/implicitation research. This kind of situation is very unproductive to explain the translation shifts. In order to solve this issue, I would like to propose a new typology of explicitation and implicitation based on Relevance Theory’s concept of explicitness. This theory is a branch of Cognitive Pragmatics and was developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) on the basis of the work of Paul Grice (1967). Based on a comprehensive framework of meaning interpretation, my typology is able to address the complexity of explicitation/
implication and may also bring all the different approaches together in future research. In order to arrive at this, I will first discuss the existing different concepts of explicitness/implicitness, the main tenets of Relevance Theory and its distinction of the explicit and implicit. Later in the paper, I will explain how it may be used as a basis for a framework to study explicitation and implicitation.

2 The Explicit and Implicit

In the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the adjective *explicit* itself is described as having several meanings: “developed in detail; hence, clear, definite”; “distinctly expressing all that is meant; leaving nothing merely implied or suggested”; and “sexually explicit, that describes or portrays nudity or sexual activity” (*Oxford English Dictionary* 1989/2000). All these different meanings can be raised to a more generic meaning which is related to the visibility, comprehensibility, and/or accessibility of something that has already been expressed.

In the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the adjective *implicit* has several entries, among which are “implied though not plainly expressed; naturally or necessarily involved in, or capable of being inferred from, something else”; and “virtually or potentially contained in” (*Oxford English Dictionary* 1989/2000). In general these meanings are concerned with indirect accessibility, be it via inference, being contained by something else, or implication.

With the above understanding, the concepts of explicitness and implicitness are very complex. In General Linguistics, however, a piece of information is considered to be “explicit” only when it is encoded in linguistic forms; whereas information is said to be “implicit” when it is recoverable only by inference. This traditional use of the terms “explicit” and “implicit” do not seem to have any theoretical basis and seem to be used only as an informal alternative to those of “encoded and inferred” (*Carston* 2002; *Allen* 2009).1 In line with this encoded/inferred distinction, Larson explains the concept of implicit information as “that [information] for which there is no form” but which is “a part of the total communication intended or assumed by the writer” (*Larson* 1984: 38). According to Gutt, this explanation is correct from the point of view of the speaker, but it raises the problem of how a listener identifies when information is implied, since only the speaker has access to the intention behind the statement (*Gutt* 2000: 87). Communication requires two parties. While the speaker may assume that she/he has conveyed a message, communication does not occur until the hearer completes the transaction. With this understanding of interpretation, the concept of explicit and implicit meanings also needs to accommodate the two interlocutors.

The encoded/inferred framework is also somewhat superficial as it only relies on encodedness to divide between the explicit and implicit. It cannot explain, for instance, why a sentence/utterance such as *Anna hid her long legs under the table*, which

---

1 Dr Cynthia Allen, Australian National University, 3 April 2009 (personal communication).
pluralizes the word *leg*, does not seem to be more “explicit” than its Indonesian translation *Anna menyembunyikan kaki panjangnya di bawah meja*, which does not mark the number of the legs.\(^2\) Here the encoded/inferred distinction cannot account for processability as an aspect of explicitness. Apart from the above issues, the encoded/inferred distinction of the explicit/implicit can be represented by the following diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explicit</th>
<th>Encoded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>Inferred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1: Explicitness based on the traditional encoded/inferred meaning levels

Unlike in the encoded/inferred distinction, textual or discourse-based explicitness is more a matter of degree than just category. It is generally measured by the type-token ratio, which is normally associated with informativeness. Here the degrees of explicitness of a particular language are seen to depend on factors such as emphasis/focus and topicality in the information packaging. This approach goes much further than the encoded/inferred distinction. Focus may be signalled by a particular structure (e.g. cleft sentence structures, intensifiers like *very, even*, etc.), and also by tonal stress (see Leafgren 2002). However, according to Leafgren, focus refers to semantically or pragmatically outstanding elements because they are “contrastive, surprising, or in some other way deserving a special attention” (Leafgren 2002: 23).\(^3\) Topicality, on the other hand, deals with “aboutness” (Leafgren 2002: 27). This depends on whether the topic (normally the grammatical subject) is encoded or simply left to be inferred. This textual/discourse-based explicitness can be demonstrated with the diagram below:

---

\(^2\) The example is an analogy of Heltai’s (2005) example of *Her eyes are blue* versus the Hungarian *Kék a szeme*. Pragmatic theories are one option that may explain such cases. Under Grice’s (1967) view, for instance, the plural information in the Indonesian version can only be recovered by inference; the utterance would still share the same “what is said” with the English sentence. Relevance Theory goes further with this view by categorizing such inferrable information into the explicit because the recovery of any communicated assumption, including those encoded in linguistic forms, needs an element of inference. In order to arrive at the interpretation that ‘the legs’ most likely belong to Anna and not to someone else, for instance, the hearer needs to infer from the context, just as what one would do to arrive at the number of the legs in the Indonesian version. This is because languages are too weak to be able to encode all the humanly possible thoughts and hence they can never be fully explicit in what we say (Sperber/Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 2002).

\(^3\) According to Leafgren, “emphasis” is the more general term of focus, in which focus refers to “significant emphasis on a particular element within the context of the information conveyed in a particular clause” (Leafgren 2002: 23-24).
Explicitation based on textual explicitness focuses on what is encoded in the target text (TT) but not in the source text (ST), regardless of whether or not this information is inferrable from the ST context. While this approach is practical especially for studies involving a large corpus, it does not explain how the translator arrives at a particular translation in terms of its relationship to the source text. Because of this, we cannot measure the extent of the shifts of meaning and the translator’s “fidelity” towards the source text.

Further, in discourse analysis (e.g. Schiffrin 1994/2003), textual explicitness is often combined with the encoded/inferred distinction, so that it occupies the encoded slot of the encoded/inferred distinction. This is because the encoded/inferred distinction has been traditionally accepted as the equivalent of the explicit/implicit distinction of meaning levels.

The above figure indicates that what is inferred is automatically implicit, and what is encoded is explicit, but with a higher or lower degree of explicitness. Based on this categorization, we can say, for instance, that within the encoded area, expression A is
more explicit than B, or B is more implicit than A. However, any expression in the implicit slot is bound to be more implicit than any of those in the encoded slot. Those in the encoded slot, however, are always more informative, more specific, etc. This combined system is very helpful when dealing with static explicitness in discourse analysis.

The combination, however, does not seem to work well when applied to explicitation, which has a dynamic character. This is because the inferred meaning spelled out in explicitation may be more general than the source item it has replaced. However, what is more general cannot be more explicit according to this system. Let us look at Kamenická’s (2007: 48) example from the translation of David Lodge’s *Small World* (1984, in Kamenická 2007) into Czech (1988, in Kamenická 2007):4

ST: The job of check-in clerk at Heathrow, or any other airport, is not a glamorous or particularly satisfying one. (Lodge: *Small World*)

TT: Registrovat cestující u přepážky na letišti, ať už v Londýně nebo kdekoli jinde, není atraktivní ani zvláště uspokojivé zaměstnání.

TT*: Checking in passengers at an airport counter, whether in London or anywhere else, is not an attractive or particularly satisfying job.

In the example, ‘Heathrow’ is dropped and the more general term ‘London’ is encoded instead to improve the translation’s readability for the Czech readers. According to Kamenická, when this translation was published (1988), air travel was still a luxury in the Czech Republic and therefore many of the target readers might not have been aware that Heathrow is a London airport. This translation choice is based on assumptions about the availability of particular concepts in the target reader’s cognitive store. Regardless of the reason, in terms of the encoded/inferred distinction, this is just a case of the explicitation of an implicit meaning, with a target text that happens to be more general than the source text. Obviously this does not fit the criteria of the combined system of explicitness, because to be more explicit, according to this model, the information needs to be more specific or more informative.

Thus, although the combined system of static explicitness provides more analytic power for discourse analysis than the use of the encoded/inferred distinction alone, it does not fit the dynamic nature of explicitation in Translation Studies. Of course, the combined system (and the discourse-based model alone) can still be used to analyse translated materials, provided it is understood that it can only describe the textual explicitness of the translation, and does not take into account the meaning shifts that have taken place in the process of translation.

Another type of explicitness is explicitness as cognitive processability (see Heltai 2005). Within this type, it is the hearer who actually determines the degree of explicitness, based on his/her point of view. This is problematic since explicitness, in
this sense, is very relative and depends on the context and the audience receiving the message. What is explicit to one hearer may not be explicit to another. Thus, while in some contexts and with some interlocutors, detailed presentation of information may help to communicate the speaker’s intention, in other contexts a more general but more familiar representation may be much more helpful. For example, a message may be delivered in figurative language, yet the listener may still say that it is explicit enough to be understood. While such processability is an important aspect of explicitness/implicitness, it cannot be used as the only criterion to describe explicitness/implicitness in explicitation/implicitation.

All the above issues demonstrate that none of the existing frameworks of “explicitness” and “implicitness” can satisfactorily explain our complex intuition of the concepts, which is basically associated with the process of interpretation. With such approaches, it is not surprising that research on explicitation/implicitation does not seem to provide a good explanation of the translation phenomena. A redefinition of the concepts of explicitness/implicitness is therefore crucial to be able to describe explicitation and implicitation. For this purpose investigation into theories of interpretation is necessary to find alternative concepts of the explicit and implicit. With this in mind I studied various interpretation theories\(^5\) to redefine the central concepts in explicitation/implicitation (Murtisari 2011). From this study I found that Relevance Theory, which is a branch of cognitive pragmatics, has the largest potential to explain explicitness/implicitness in explicitation/implicitation. On the basis of the theory, I have developed a typology of scalar/categorical explicitation/de-explicitation, which combines the explicitness/implicitness approaches we have discussed and reconciles the conflict in the status of specification and generalization with explicitation and implicitation (Murtisari 2011: 101-104).

3 Redefining the Explicit/Implicit through Relevance Theory

3.1 Relevance Theory

Relevance Theory (RT) is a further elaboration of Grice’s theory of meaning (1967) by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995). My choice of Relevance Theory is based on its clear view of the inferential nature of communication and the theory’s non-literal approach to meaning and interpretation. It strongly adheres to the “linguistic underdeterminacy thesis”, which argues that linguistic meanings do not automatically determine what the speaker must have meant. Here the semantics of natural languages is seen as too weak to encode all humanly thinkable thoughts. All that one can do as a listener engaged in verbal communication is to infer possible meanings from the linguistic signs one hears. These signs are inevitably an incomplete semantic representation of the

thoughts of the speaker. Indeed, interpretation is not a process of recovering messages from the form in which they have been packaged, but rather one of actively recreating meanings from symbols. On this basis, Relevance Theory extends the boundaries of the explicit by recognizing the importance of context in the interpretation of explicit meaning.

Central to Relevance Theory is its proposition that human communication is governed by cognitive principles rather than principles of language usage (“Cooperative Maxims”). These cognitive principles are summed up in one main principle, i.e. the principle of relevance. Sperber and Wilson believe that human attention and thought are automatically geared toward the information which seems personally relevant, i.e. when it has a connection with background information a person has in his/her mind to yield conclusions that matter to him/her (Sperber/Wilson 1986/1995, 1987; Wilson/Sperber 2004). “To communicate” is “to claim someone’s attention, hence to communicate is to imply that the information communicated is relevant” (Sperber/Wilson 1987: 697).

The degree of relevance is further determined by two factors: contextual effects and processing efforts. The greater the contextual effects the hearer achieves, the greater the relevance of the text; but the greater the processing effort the hearer needs in order to arrive at these effects, the lower the relevance. It is therefore reasonable for the hearer to adopt the interpretation given by the path which requires least effort, “in the absence of contrary evidence” (Wilson/Sperber 2004: 259), to fulfill his or her expectations of relevance. In other words, the cognitive processing of the communicative stimulus will stop when the expectation for relevance is satisfied (or abandoned). According to Wilson and Sperber, the interpretation the hearer arrives at may be wrong, but it is still “the most plausible hypothesis” (Wilson/Sperber 2004: 259) of the speaker’s meaning for that hearer in the circumstances.

3.2 Relevance Theory and the Explicature/Implicature Distinction

In Relevance Theory, the distinction between the explicit and the implicit is represented by the division between the concepts of explicature and implicature, which are elaborated on the basis of Grice’s “what is said” and “conversational implicature” (Grice 1967). The term “explicature” was invented as a parallel to Grice’s term of implicature in order to give more weight to the pragmatic contribution in understanding the explicit content. According to Relevance Theory, explicature is never fully explicit due to the underdeterminate nature of language and is merely a matter of degree (Carston 2002).

The explicature and implicature are developed according to certain formulations (Sperber/Wilson 1986/1995). Note that the term “logical form” used here refers to “a syntactically structured string of concepts with some slots of free variables, indicating where certain contextual values (in the form of concepts) must be supplied” (Carston 2002: 64). The formulated concepts are as follows:
1. An assumption communicated by an utterance \( U \) is *explicit* [hence an “explicature”] if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by \( U' \).

2. An assumption communicated by \( U \) which is not explicit is implicit [hence an “implicature”].

Given the above definitions, Relevance Theory’s implicatures are implications that are derived purely from contextually based inference, and hence these are also referred to as contextual implications. These implications can be further characterized as the implicated premise and the implicated conclusion (Carston 2002: 377). Consider the following exchange:

(1) Budi: Did you join the bushwalking?

   Ani: I’m scared of snakes.

Ani’s reply to Budi may lead him to infer, for instance, that there are snakes in the bush or that one may run into one in the area in which the bushwalking takes place. By using these implications as a premise, he may arrive at an implicated conclusion that Ani did not join the bushwalking because, being scared of snakes, she did not want to be near them or run into one in the bush. This implicature is considered “strong” because its retrieval is important in order to understand the utterance. With further processing, Budi may also arrive at a “weak” implicature, which is not essential for the understanding of the utterance, for instance, that Ani may not join any bushwalking excursion.

Further, Relevance Theory does not treat metaphors and figurative language as a violation of any communicative maxim, but as merely different routes to arriving at optimal relevance (Wilson/Sperber 2004). In processing a figurative utterance like ‘C is a torch in the dark’, for instance, “there is no suggestion that the literal meaning must be tested first” (Wilson/Sperber 2004: 268). In the circumstances A will not be likely to examine whether \( C \) is a torch or human, but, expecting a reply to the question of how \( C \) has been doing in the team, an array of encyclopaedic knowledge of the qualities of ‘a torch in the dark’ will be accessed instead. Such an array may contain information such as the way in which a torch in the dark helps to reveal things that are otherwise hidden, thus preventing collisions, etc. From this concept, A will be arriving at a range of similar weak implicatures (normally referred to as “connotations” in day to day understanding), such as that \( C \) has been very helpful to the team; that he or she has revealed new options, etc. In the interpretation of non-literal language, these weak implicatures all together are important to help construct a relevant interpretation, but are not individually required to understand the utterance (Sperber/Wilson 1986/1995; Wilson/Sperber 2004).

---

6 For clarification, implicated premise and implicated conclusion are sometimes also referred to as contextual assumption and contextual implication respectively (see e.g. Carston 2002: 335-336; Wilson/Carston 2006). The use of the generic term (contextual implication) to refer to implicated conclusion may be confusing for a new Relevance Theory reader, as the term includes both types of implicatures.
Unlike implicatures, explicatures derive from two different sources: the linguistic forms used and the context. Thus they come from two distinct processes, linguistic decoding and pragmatic inference (Carston 2002). Explicatures are therefore not closely tied to conventional linguistic meaning (“what is said”). They require more pragmatic processes for their meaning to be recovered than the resolution of ambiguities and reference assignment, i.e. the development or “enrichment” of the “logical form”. Take, for example, the following conversation:

(2) Budi: Did your husband volunteer for the environment association?

   Ani (with a happy smile): He did.

In light of a theory of utterance meaning, Ani’s short reply to Budi might communicate the following explicatures:

(3)

(a) Ani’s husband volunteered for the environmental association.

(b) Ani is happy that her husband volunteered for the environmental association.

(c) Ani believes that her husband volunteered for the environmental association.

However, in a situation where the speakers are concerned with environmental issues, Budi might equate the explicatures with the simple proposition 3 (a) or the higher-level explicature 3 (c). In a context where Ani is a passionate environmentalist but her husband is normally not interested in her environmental activities, Budi may get the explicature 3 (b) (see Carston 2002: 119). Thus the concept of “explicature” is wider than Grice’s “what is said”. In the above case, it is not only limited to the minimal proposition of Ani’s reply, ‘He volunteered for the environmental association’, but also to developments of it, such as 3 (b) and 3 (c). I will discuss the specific types of enrichment processes of explicature later in this paper (Section 3.4). In the discussion of ad hoc concepts (Section 3.4.2), following Carston (2002), I will see that enrichment may take place not only at the clausal level, but also at the lexical or word level.

It is important to note that an explicature is not “a special kind of implicature [… ] that embellishes logical form in limited ways”, as Levinson claims (2000: 238). Carston argues:

[It is not the case that an explicature embellishes a logical form, pragmatic inferences do that; rather an explicature is a kind of representation that results from the pragmatic embellishment of a logical form. (Carston 2002: 148)

Again, the concept of explicatures is based on the underdeterminacy thesis, in which communication is seen to always involve some element of inference, since language symbols cannot make all the thoughts of the speaker fully explicit.

Last but not least, different utterances may have the same explicatures, but with a different degree of explicitness (Carston 2002: 117):
Any one of the above utterances may be used in different contexts to express the same proposition. However, by no means do they have the same pragmatic effects since they have different degrees of explicitness. Here the first three utterances about the table (4 (a), 4 (b), 4 (c)) will require less inference to interpret compared to the rest of the utterances, and therefore are more explicit. The smaller the contribution of the context, the more explicit the explicature is.

Thus we see, as Sperber and Wilson argue, that explicitness is both classificatory and comparative (1986/1995: 182). It is classificatory, because in terms of explicature, it defines what can be considered as explicit and implicit, but at the same time it is also comparative because it is gradable. This claim is very important for our study of explicitation, because so far it has only been the explication of implicatures that has been addressed by relevance theorists. It is due to the comparative nature of explicitness that, as we shall see later, explicitation within explicatures is also possible.

3.3 Entailment in Relevance Theory and the Extension of the Definition of Explicature

Besides conversational implicatures, there is another type of logical consequence of the conventional linguistic meaning called "entailments" in the Gricean theory of pragmatics (see Levinson 1983). While a conversational implicature is cancellable, an entailment is not. In Relevance Theory, however, this type of meaning has a different status. It could either belong to explicature or implicature. In a sentence with more than one clause, for instance, each clause, which is an entailment of the source sentence, is categorized as an explicature. In the following sentence, the entailments 5 (b) and 5 (c) are considered to be explicatures of 5 (a):

As we look into Relevance Theory for an account of the explicit/implicit distinction, we shall also consider Bach’s (1994) proposal of his middle category, impliciture.

This is because the truth of entailments is directly linked to what is said. A sentence p is said to entail q if in every conceivable situation in which p is true, q is true. As a consequence of this logic, when q is false, then p is also false. An example of entailment is the relationship between the sentence ‘The king has been assassinated’ and ‘The king is dead’. In this case, if the king has been assassinated, he must now be dead. Likewise, the sentence ‘Kim is a mother’ entails that ‘Kim is a woman’. If Kim is not a woman, then she cannot be a mother.
Roger Federer won this year’s Australian Open and was asked to do a walk of fame. (a)

Roger Federer won this year’s Australian Open. (b)

Roger Federer was asked to do a walk of fame. (c)

However, as Carston points out (2002: 123), this is not the case with single clauses, as in her example exemplified below:

(Confidentially) the judge is my father. (a)

The judge is a man. (b)

(Unfortunately) I’ve bought some pork. (a)

I bought some meat. (b)

In any semantic theory, 6 (b) and 7 (b) are the entailments of 6 (a) and 7 (a), respectively. Yet, unlike in the previous cases, these entailments cannot be categorized as explicatures because they are not the development of the logical form of the encoded meaning (Carston 2002: 123). Therefore, Carston expands the definition of explicatures as follows:

An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an “explicature” of the utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential subpart of a logical form. (Carston 2002: 124)

It needs to be made clear here that, to borrow Carston’s words, “being a communicated entailment of the proposition expressed may be neither necessary nor sufficient for qualification as an explicature” (Carston 2002: 123). This point is important because it is a mistake to consider entailments as belonging to the area of explicatures. Furthermore, as Carston herself points out, the concept of entailment does not belong to Relevance Theory at all:

In my view, the concept of entailment and the concept of implicature belong to different explanatory levels, in fact different sorts of theory, the one a static semantic theory which captures knowledge of linguistic meaning, the other an account of the cognitive processes and representations involved in understanding utterances, so there is no reason at all why one and the same element of meaning should not fall into both categories. (Carston 2004: 18-19)

It is also important to note, in relation to example 7 (b), that whether a particular sentence is an explicature or an implicature of an utterance does not depend on the relative resemblance or difference from the source utterance, but on the process of the production of meaning. A sentence is an explicature if the inferential process takes
place at the level of the logical form within the utterance. On the other hand, an implicature is only derived by inference.

3.4 Enrichment Processes in the Recovery of Explicatures

Besides disambiguation and reference assignment, there are at least three other processes involved in the development of logical form to recover the explicature. These are: saturation or the filling up of slots, free enrichment, and ad hoc concept construction.

3.4.1 Saturation and Free Enrichment

The term “saturation” has been borrowed by Relevance Theory from Recanati (1989), whose theory has many similarities with Relevance Theory. It refers to the pragmatic process of filling or “saturating” the slots in the linguistically decoded logical form with inferential meaning. Examples of saturation are as follows:

\[(8)\]

(a) The pyramid of Giza is much older. [than what?]

(b) Anna has left her umbrella. [where?]

The logical forms of the above utterances are not yet complete, and the gaps can be filled in by resorting to the context of the communication. For instance, for 8 (a), the pyramid of Giza is much older than the Borobudur temple, and, for 8 (b), Anna has left her umbrella in the lecture room.

The term “free enrichment” has also been borrowed from Recanati (2004). Unlike saturation, in which the slots are linguistically given, the slots in “free enrichment” are covert. Consider the following examples:

\[(9)\]

(a) Tom doesn’t have anything. (He’s only a student.)

(b) I need time to make a decision.

The minimal proposition of 9 (a) is obviously false because Tom has things like clothes, a little money in the bank, etc., that it will not be seen as contributing to the intended communicated assumption. To recover a more complete proposition, the concept ‘doesn’t have anything’ may be developed into, for instance, ‘Tom doesn’t have anything worth a lot of money that would make him financially secure.’ The minimal proposition of 9 (b), on the other hand, is also so trivially true that it will not be considered as a communicated assumption either. People will normally enrich the concept ‘need time’ in order to fulfill the expectation for optimal relevance, e.g. ‘need some time’.
3.4.2 The ad hoc or Online Concepts

In her development of Relevance Theory, Carston’s elaboration of the idea of ad hoc concepts is based on the work of Barsalou (1983). Here the enrichment of an utterance’s explication is seen not only to take place at the phrase level, in the way we have discussed so far, but also at the lexical level. This is because the meanings of words are mostly “not linguistically given” but are pragmatically constructed “on line” or “on the fly” by the hearer in response to specific contexts. This is consistent with the underdeterminate nature of language, in which its symbols only serve as pointers because they cannot represent all the thoughts we have (Carston 2002; Wilson/Carston 2006). Let us consider Carston’s examples below:

\[(10)\]

(a) Tracy has a fast car.
(b) The Pritchards are rich.
(c) Here’s my new flatmate. [Referring to a new pet]
(d) On Classic FM, we play continuous classics.

In the above utterances, the underlying concept is either strengthened or loosened to meet the expectations of the context. The interpretation of the adjectives ‘fast’ and ‘rich’ would go beyond their semantic meanings in different contexts. In one context, ‘fast’ in 10 (a) may mean ‘fast enough for her to catch the train’, while in another ‘fast enough to compete in a rally’. Similarly, ‘rich’ in 10 (b) might be taken to convey ‘rich enough to give us a shout’, ‘rich enough to send their son to a private school’, etc. In utterances 10 (c) and 10 (d), the concept of the italicized words are broadened/loosened by selecting only the relevant meaning properties of the encoded forms and ignoring those that do not fit the given context.\(^9\) In 10 (d), for instance, the FM station classical music is actually not strictly played ‘continuously’ because there are commercial breaks. The concept CONTINUOUS here has been loosened/broadened into CONTINUOUS*. Similarly, in 10 (c), the semantic meaning of ‘flatmate’ normally refers to a person, but

\[^9\] Carston, following Jerry Fodor (Fodor et al. 1980; Fodor 1998), believes that lexical items as atomic concepts are linked to three different types of information in memory, i.e., logical content, encyclopaedic or general knowledge, and lexical properties (Carston 2002: 321). The logical entry consists of a set of inference rules, or ‘meaning postulates’, and is normally far from anything definitional. The encyclopaedic entry, on the other hand, consists of different kinds of knowledge, e.g., common assumptions, scientific information, culture specific beliefs and personal observations and experiences. Finally, the lexical entry is related to formal linguistic properties such as phonetic, phonological, and syntactic elements that make up the symbol for the concept. GIRAFFE, for instance, has three entries. The logical content is ‘an animal of some kind’; while the encyclopaedic knowledge consists of such information as the fact that it is found in Africa. Its lexical entry is that it is a noun, etc. Not every word, however, has all three entries. The word ‘and’, for example, has a logical concept but it does not have an encyclopaedic entry.
in the above context this feature is dropped and only the encyclopedic meanings are maintained.

However, while the earlier version of Relevance Theory treated the enrichment of lexical concepts as contributing to explicatures, it is interesting that this did not happen with the loose use of language (see e.g. Sperber/Wilson 1986/1995). Carston, however, argues that the latter is misleading since both enrichment and loosening actually are symmetrical processes:

[...] in the case of narrowing, all the logical properties are retained, while in the case of loosening, some of them are dropped. Both outcomes involve a move away from strict literalness, albeit in opposite directions (above and below literalness), so we might well expect that either both sorts of result figure in the proposition expressed by the utterance, or that neither does. (Carston 2002: 334).

In terms of more non-literal language, the consequence is even more problematic: the implicatures are derived without the proposition expressed playing any role. This seems incorrect. In the example that C has been ‘a torch in the dark’, the hearer cannot make up any assumption about C having been very useful, unless the non-literal expression allows at least a basis for such an inference. Here the utterance would activate the hearer’s general knowledge of ‘a torch in the dark’, such as to prevent someone from getting lost, helping people to see things, etc., and in relation to the context the logical concept, say ‘a source of light’ is dropped. Because of this Carston believes that the ad hoc concepts of non-literal expressions must contribute to the proposition, thus enabling the utterance to assert something (as an explicature) in communication.

The use of ad hoc concepts, Carston says, is made possible by our mental capacity to be flexible and creative when using the limited number of available linguistic clues available to convey countless different concepts. She suggests that a speaker can use a concept of a particular form to express another distinct concept via interplay between the former and the context (Carston 2002: 322). Speakers may use metaphors in this way when they think there is no other available form to convey or when they see that a non-literal utterance would better represent their thoughts (Carston 2002: 331). For instance, although the speaker might also say ‘she has been very resourceful and we would not have made it without her’, etc., the expression ‘she has been a torch in the dark’ may communicate all the same messages more economically.

This use of the ad hoc concept is in line with the view prevailing in Relevance Theory that the propositional forms of utterances only tend to represent people’s thoughts (and thus are used interpretively) rather than representing a state of affairs in the world (descriptive use). In this case, the relation between the proposition presented and the content of the thought is based on “interpretive resemblance”, in other words that there is some degree of shared content (Carston 2002: 331). The more the logical and contextual implications the two share, the more literal the utterance is. Yet, their
resemblance is generally not expected to be identical and this is where non-literalness derives from (Carston 2002: 332).10

4 Application of Relevance Theory to Explicitation and Implicitation in Translation

4.1 Explicitation

In order to apply the concepts of explicature and implicature to explicitation, we need to make some adjustment to what has been considered so far. This is because Relevance theorists working on translation normally only discuss explicitation of implicatures into explicatures, which is covered under the term "explication". However, as noted already, these processes are different from the traditional encoded/inferred dichotomy, in which explicitation covers shifts from the inferred to the encoded:

```
Encoded/explicit TT

Explication

Inferred/implicit ST
```

Fig. 4: Traditional explicitation

10 The above account seems valid for figurative cases in general, yet, in my opinion, it also seems to imply that non-literalness always takes place at the level of the utterance's proposition. It suggests that people always have relatively literal meanings in their mind first and then transform them into a non-literal expression in order to achieve optimal effects. I believe that this is not necessarily the case, especially when dealing with figurative language, such as metaphors. There is considerable evidence that we tend to incorporate new experiences, or give meanings to realities or to understand them, by making analogies, comparisons, and alignments to previously acquired information (without having to discern the specific experience analytically). In the light of this, it is also probable that some thoughts arise in the speaker in a "non-literal" way before they are communicated. In other words, the relation does not have to be procedural, in the sense that literalness in thoughts always precedes non-literalness in an utterance’s proposition.
If we compare the two diagrams above, it will be clear that while the traditional concept of explicitation covers all areas of inferential meanings involved in the shifts to the explicit, there are areas of inference in Relevance Theory that are not included in this concept. These are the inferential elements within the explicature:

Shifts within explicature, on the other hand, are covered separately in the concepts of expansion/completion/enrichment of the logical form of the utterance. For the purpose of investigating explicitation in Translation Studies, it will be helpful if we can expand the explication framework to include the shifts within explicatures. With this in mind, I would like to propose two types of explicitation as an alternative to the Relevance Theory concepts of “explication” and “expansion/completion/enrichment”: “scalar” and “categorical” explicitations. It is worth noting that the traditional term “explicitation” is used here because it is already well-known in Translation Studies.

Scalar explicitation refers to explicitation shifts within the explicature. In terms of translation, this takes the form of the encoding (in TT) of inferred information from the source text’s explicature. This type is scalar because the inferred meanings spelled out are already explicit and, therefore, the explicitation only makes them more explicit in
terms of degree. This is possible because explicitness is also comparative in nature. An example of scalar explicitation can be seen in the following translation:

(11)

(a) “Mau pergi kemana?”, tanya Anton kepada Sari.
(b) Will(inf) go to where? Ask Anton to Sari
(c) “Where are you going?”, Anton asked Sari.

In the above example, the Indonesian text does not identify the subject ‘you’ as referring to Sari and the time frame of the event since Indonesian does not use a tense system. The English translation, however, encodes the subject ‘you’ and also the tense and aspectual markers of the verbs (‘are going’ and ‘asked’). Thus there are at least three shifts in the rendering: the encoding of ‘you’, the tense/aspect ‘are going’, and the past tense ‘asked’. These shifts may be considered “scalar” because they are a development of the ST forms and the target text still shares the same explicature as the source text. They represent explicitation shifts because the meanings spelled out are already explicit within the Indonesian context. However, they become more explicit in terms of degree when they are encoded in the English target text. The scalar explicitation, thereby, can be represented in the following way:

\[ X \rightarrow X', \text{ in which } X' \text{ is a development of the form } X \text{ and is more explicit than } X, \text{ and } X' \text{ represents the same explicature as } X. \]

Scalar explicitation shifts may result not only from the encoding of a meaning that is otherwise inferred in the ST (and thus addition of new meaningful unit), but also the specification of this meaning, as long as the shift still represents a development of the ST’s logical form. Scalar explicitation is a shift to a higher degree of textual/discourse explicitness, which can be seen as a textual/discourse-based explicitation in traditional terms, but it is at the same time also a process explicitation because the TT must be a development of the ST meaning. If the TT meaning is not related to the ST, the shift may fall in the category of “meaning modification” or “mistranslation”, a topic which will be discussed in section 4.6.

The second type of explicitation, the categorical type, is basically the same as the Relevance Theory term “explication”. It refers to shifts of meaning from the implicature to explicature and is categorical because it transforms the shifted meaning from one category to the other, i.e., from the implicit to the explicit. Take, for example, the following hypothetical translation:
ST: “Dinginnya!” kata wanita itu. [“So cold!” said the woman.]

Ia segera menutup jendela besar itu dan meminta maaf.

[‘He immediately closed the big window and apologized.’]

TT: “It’s freezing! Could you close the window, please?” the lady said.

He closed the big window immediately and apologized.

The spelling out of ‘Could you close the window, please?’ in the TT may be considered categorical because, although it is an implicature of what the lady said (‘So cold!’), it is part of the explicature in the translation. Thus the information has moved to a different category. On the other hand, it may be considered an explicitation because it makes the spelled out meaning more accessible by its being encoded (whereas before it was only inferred). Here the categorical explicitation may be notated as follows:

\[ X \rightarrow X', \text{ in which } X \text{ is an implicature in the ST and becomes an explicature } X' \text{ in the TT.} \]

Taking both types of explicitation into account, we can now redefine the more generic explicitation as “shifts of meaning from the implicit to the explicit or simply to higher degree of explicitness”. This definition is more useful than the encoded/inferred distinction; not only can we combine both textual/discourse explicitness and that based on meaning levels, but we can also see which more specific level(s) of meanings are involved in the explicitation shifts.

4.2 Implicitation

The scalar/categorical typology seems to work for explicitation, but how about implicitation? There seems to be a problem here with the application of this traditional term, which is similar to explicitation. In Relevance Theory the concept of implicitation only applies to the shift from the implicature to the explicature. Now let us compare the term “implicitation” in its traditional sense but from the point of view of Relevance Theory:

---

Fig. 7: Traditional implicitation
In the first diagram (Fig. 7), the traditional concept of implicitation covers shifts from the encoded to the amorphous area of the inferred (which in Relevance Theory can be described as enrichment or further interpretation of an utterance). In the Relevance Theory diagram (Fig. 8), on the other hand, only the categorical shift from the explicature to the implicature is covered by the concept of implication. In other words, Relevance Theory’s implicitation cannot cover all the shifts normally covered in the traditional description. Here the shifts from the encoded to the inferred area in the explicature, which are dealt with under the concepts of “broadening/weakening”, are omitted (see Fig. 9).

Because of this, we need to expand the concept of Relevance Theory “implicitation” to include the scalar shifts to the less explicit degree within the explicatures. However, this presents another problem, since we cannot retain the traditional term “implicitation” for these scalar shifts. This is because the implicit area in Relevance Theory only belongs to the implicature, while scalar shifts take place in the explicit area of the explicature. We, therefore, have to use another term (I suggest “de-explicitation”) to include the uncovered area. To “de-explicitate” would mean “to shift a particular meaning from the explicit to the implicit or to simply lower its degree of explicitness”.

---

Fig. 8: Relevance Theory “implicitation” (implication)

Fig. 9: Translation shifts not yet covered by Relevance Theory “implicitation”
With this new term, we can develop two counterparts to scalar and categorical explicitations, namely scalar and categorical de-explicitations.

Scalar de-explicitation is simply the reverse of scalar explicitation, as can be seen in the following back translation from the previous rendering:

(13)
Anton to Sari: “Where are you going?
Anton ke Sari: “Mau pergi ke mana?”
Will(inf) go to where?

The English text encodes the subject ‘you’, which refers to Sari, and marks the verb by the present continuous tense, meaning that the event described is taking place at the time of focus and the event is in progress. The Indonesian text, however, leaves these meanings to the context, and therefore they move from the encoded to the non-encoded level of the explicature. This shift may be considered scalar because the omission of ‘you’ is simply a development of an individual form of the explicature. It is a de-explicitation because the TT becomes less explicit than the ST (making the reader work more on inference). It is important to note here that the de-explicitation may not only result from omission, but also from less direct inference, a change from non-figurative to figurative expressions, and a generalization. Scalar de-explicitation, therefore, can be represented as follows:

\[ X \rightarrow X', \text{ in which } X' \text{ is a less explicit form of } X \text{ and } X' \text{ represents the same explicature as } X \text{ does.} \]

An example of the categorical de-explicitation, on the other hand, can be seen in the following back translation of the previous rendering:

(14)
ST: “It’s freezing! Could you close the window, please?” the lady said.
He closed the big window immediately and apologized.

TT: “Dinginnya!” kata wanita itu. [“So cold!” said the woman.]  
Ia segera menutup jendela besar itu dan meminta maaf.
[‘He immediately closed the window and apologized.’]

The Indonesian text does not translate the request of the lady, but simply leaves it to the context as an implication to her complaint that it was cold. This is my own example, but in translation this omission could be made for some other reason, for instance to make the translation shorter or to achieve some extra contextual effect. In this case, the direct request has undergone a categorical de-explicitation, which moves the
message from the explicit category (explicature) to the implicit one (implicature). This shift can be represented by the notation below:

\[ X \rightarrow X', \text{ in which } X \text{ is an explicature in the ST and becomes an implicature } X' \text{ in the TT.} \]

In practical terms, categorical explicitation involves the omission of the whole proposition of the explicature, but the meaning can still be inferred as an implicature.

4.3 Generalization and Specification in the Scalar/Categorical Typology

In Klaudy and Károly’s (2003, 2005) categories of explicitation, specification is classified as a form of explicitation while generalization belongs to implicitation. They define specification as the replacement of a SL unit of a more general meaning with a TL unit of a more specific meaning. Generalization, on the other hand, is defined as a replacement from an SL unit with a more specific meaning to a TL unit with a more general meaning. These shifts take place at the lexical and phrasal levels.

But what are the positions of specification and generalization in the scalar/categorical typology? From a closer examination, we are able to see finer details of the shifts in specification and generalization. While in Klaudy and Karoly’s typology every specification and generalization lends itself to explicitation and implicitation respectively, this is not the case in the scalar/categorical model. Let us first examine an example of specification:

(15)

(a) Ibukota selalu dipenuhi dengan manusia.

‘The capital is always packed with humans.’

(b) Jakarta is always crowded with humans/people.

In the above translation, the word ‘ibukota’, ‘the capital’ in the Indonesian TT has been specified as ‘Jakarta’. Given that the capital of Indonesia is Jakarta, the translation is a development of the ST’s logical form and still shares the same explicature with the ST. The translation is therefore a scalar explicitation.

Another example of specification that is a scalar explicitation can be seen in the following translation:

(16)

(a) Budi bought chicken at the halal butcher’s.

(b) Budi membeli dada ayam di toko daging halal.

‘Budi bought chicken breast at the halal butcher’s.’

Suppose the translator wants to make his/her rendering more informative and the additional information is specified somewhere else in the context, he/she could make the specification shown in the above example. Here the noun ‘chicken’ is rendered into
‘chicken breast’, which is a development of the logical form of the ST. Because of this, this shift is a scalar explicitation.

But let’s have a look at another example:

(17)

(a) Budi bought chicken at the halal butcher’s.
(b) Budi membeli ayam halal.

‘Budi bought halal chicken.’

In this example the noun ‘chicken’ is rendered into Indonesian as a more specific noun ‘halal chicken’. This rendering is, however, only part of the implicature of the source text. This is because the information ‘halal chicken’ in sentence 17 (b) is deduced from the context (an implicature). In other words, it is a categorical explicitation and the explicitness of the meaning is acquired by its shift from an implicature to an explicature (to the explicit). When the explicitation is based on the meaning relationship between ST and TT, this categorical shift cannot be considered to increase the informativity of the ST explicature either, because (1) it is a different proposition (not developed from the ST logical form), and (2) its status of meaning is still cancellable.\(^{11}\) All these aspects can only be seen when the target text is examined in its relationship to the source text. This seems to indicate that translation texts need a different tool from that which is applied to non-translation texts, because in the latter genre, specification always lends itself to a higher degree of explicitness.

Now, how about generalization? Cases of generalization do not always result in de-explicitation. Consider the following examples:

(18)

(a) She likes to go to Sydney and Melbourne.
(b) Ia suka pergi ke dua kota besar. [‘She likes to go to two big cities.’]
(c) Ia suka pergi kota-kota besar. [‘She likes to go to big cities.’]

In the above rendering, sentence 18 (b) is an impoverished explicature of the English text, hence scalar de-explicitation. Here the cities are not specified but just translated into more general information ‘two big cities’, making the information regarding the cities less explicit in terms of degree within the explicature. Unlike sentence 18 (b), however, sentence 18 (c) is a deductive generalization based on the English sentence 18 (a), and, therefore, is an implicature of sentence 18 (a). Because of this, it is a case of categorical explicitation.

\(^{11}\) Unlike in Grice’s theory, Relevance Theory’s implicature is not always cancellable. However, bearing in mind that it is a different proposition, it is enough to justify that the shift of meaning in categorical explicitation cannot be regarded as an increase of informativity of the ST explicature.
In contrast to this, specification and generalization are often "irreconcilable" with the notion of explicitation based on a combination of the encoded/inferred distinction and textual explicitness. This combination type seems to assume that explicitation always signifies an increase of informativity. In fact, not every meaning element in the inferred area is more specific than that encoded in the explicature, and as a result, its encoding to the explicature does not necessarily increase the informativity of the rendering.

The case is, however, different with the finer distinction of meaning levels within our pragmatic analysis and seems to be able to explain Kamenická’s case of Heathrow/London discussed earlier. Let us look again at that case. The example is provided below for convenience.

ST: The job of check-in clerk at Heathrow, or any other airport, is not a glamorous or particularly satisfying one. (Lodge: Small World)

TT: Registrovat cestující u přepážky na letišti, ať už v Londýně nebo kdekoli jinde, není atraktivní ani zvlášť uspokojivé zaměstnání.

TT*: Checking in passengers at an airport counter, whether in London or anywhere else, is not an attractive or particularly satisfying job.

To analyze the texts, we need to divide them first into their two sub-propositions, in which each is an explication of the main text (see Carston 2002). The source text can be divided as follows:

ST1: The job of check-in clerk at Heathrow is not a glamorous or particularly satisfying one.

ST2: The job of check-in clerk at any other airport is not a glamorous or particularly satisfying one.

The target text, on the other hand, consists of the following sub-propositions:

TT1: Checking in passengers at an airport counter is not an attractive or particularly satisfying job.

TT2: The airport counter is in London or anywhere else.

If we compare ST1 and TT1, TT1 seems to be an implicature because of its deductive generalization that checking in passengers at any airport is not rewarding. Thus the translation is a case of categorical explicitation. This, however, would have remained a version of the explicature, if it had been rendered into “checking in passengers at the airport counter...”, in which the shift only makes it less explicit in terms of degree. The second proposition of the rendering 'The airport counter is in London or anywhere else' is not a translation of the second ST proposition. The second ST proposition has actually been deleted and the rendering is an implicature of the whole source text. This is because Heathrow is not the only London airport, and thus the translator has made a
deductive generalization of the information available in the source text’s explicate. The rendering is therefore a case of categorical explicitation.

The above findings are different from Levinson’s (2000) view of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs). Levinson believes that generalizations like those in the above cases (and particularizations) will automatically produce implicatures. Relevance Theory, on the other hand, argues that there is no “system of default inference rules to generate implicatures” (Carston 1995: 213). According to Carston, what Levinson sees as generalized and particularized implicatures are more of a development of what is said (or explicate in the Relevance Theory terms). Again, the distinction between explicatures and implicatures is determined by the process of derivation. Both explicatures and implicatures require inference. The difference is that in explicatures the pragmatic element is used to fill in and adjust the semantic scaffolding provided by the linguistic expression used, while the derivation of implicatures is purely pragmatic (Carston 1995, 2002).

With the coherent feature of our new typology in dealing with specification and generalization, we can combine the textual and meaning-level types of explicitness within one unified account of process explicitation. Here shifts within explicatures (scalar shifts) are concerned with discourse explicitness: decrease of informativity and generalization (within explicate) will always result in de-explicitation, while the reverse produces explicitation. Categorical explicitation, on the other hand, covers shifts resulting from deductive generalization and specification which are not a development of the ST logical form and the explicitness is assessed from the change of meaning level.

4.4 Examples of Scalar and Categorical Explication and De-explictation
As a preliminary illustration of the application of the typology, the following example of scalar and categorical shifts are taken from data collected from two novels, *Of Mice and Men* (Steinbeck 1937/1970) and *The Grapes of Wrath* (Steinbeck 1939/2000), and their Indonesian translations.

1. Scalar explicitation
   ST: And since old Tom and the children could not know hurt or fear unless she acknowledged hurt and fear, she had practiced denying them in herself. (Steinbeck: *The Grapes of Wrath*: 77)
   TT: Dan sejak Tom tua dan anak-anak tidak tahu rasa sakit kecuali kalau ia sudah berlatih menolak perasaan itu [‘the feeling(s)’] dalam dirinya. (Steinbeck: *Amarah* vol. 1: 93)
   The shift may be categorized as “scalar” because ‘the feeling(s)’ (perasaan itu) is only a development of the form ‘them’ and thus the target text still shares the same explicate as the source text. It is explicitation because ‘the feeling’ is comparatively more explicit than ‘them’ because, although they share the same meaning, the target
2. Scalar de-explicitation

ST:  The rabbits hurried noiselessly for cover.  
(Steinbeck: Of Mice and Men: 7)

TT:  Diam-diam binatang-binatang itu lari menyembunyikan diri.  
(Steinbeck: Tikus dan Manusia: 8)

[Quietly the animals ran to hide themselves.]

The shift is scalar because the shift from ‘the rabbits’ into ‘the animals’ is only a formal development. It is a de-explicitation because ‘the animals’ in the TT is less explicit than the ST ‘the rabbits’, making the reader work more on inference to understand what the expression refers to.

3. Categorical explicitation

ST:  “If he finds out what a crazy bastard you are, we won’t get no job…”  
(Steinbeck: Of Mice and Men: 11)

TT:  “Kalau dia tahu engkau ini cuma anak haram jadah goblok, siallah kita.  
Kita akan kehilangan pekerjaan”.  
(Steinbeck: Tikus dan Manusia: 12)

['If he knows you are just a brainless illegitimate bastard, back luck for us.  
We’ll lose the job. ’]

The shift is categorical because ‘siallah kita’ (‘bad luck for us’) is an implicature of the explicature in the ST (“If he finds out what a crazy bastard you are, we won’t get no job”). In the TT, however, the implicature then becomes part of the explicature. It is an explicitation because it moves from the implicit (implicature) to the explicit (explicature).

4. Categorical de-explicitation

ST:  “… Maybe I can preach again. Folks out lonely on the road, folks with no lan’, no home to go to. They got to have some kind of home. […]”  
(Steinbeck: The Grapes of Wrath: 58-59)

TT:  “… Mungkin aku bisa khotbah lagi. Orang-orang kesepian di jalan, orang-orang tanpa tanah, tak ada rumah untuk pulang. [...]”  
['Maybe I can preach again. People are lonely on the road, people with no land, no home to go back to’].  
(Steinbeck: Amarah vol. 1: 71)

In the English version, the text ‘they got to have some kind of home’ in the English version is not translated in the Indonesian TT. The meaning, however, is not totally eliminated but still inferable from the TT as an implicature. The shift is therefore categorical because the respective meaning moves from being a TT explication to an
ST implicature. It is a de-explicitation because it is explicit in the ST but then becomes implicit in the TT.

5. Combination of categorical explicitation and de-explicitation

It is important to note that one single translation may simultaneously involve both categorical explicitation and de-explicitation. In fact this is commonly the case in the translation data I obtained in my thesis research (Murtisari 2011). Consider the following example:

ST: "Give you what, George?"
   "You know God damn well what. I want that mouse."
   (Steinbeck: Of Mice and Men: 13)

TT: “Apa yang kuberikan, George?”
   “Keparat, engkau mengerti betul apa. Berikan tikus itu.”
   ['Give me the mouse']
   (Steinbeck: Tikus dan Manusia: 14)

The spelling out of ‘Give me that mouse’ in the TT is a categorical explicitation, since it is an implicature of ‘I want that mouse’ in the ST. On the other hand, there is also a categorical de-explicitation, because the meaning ‘I want that mouse’ in the TT becomes an implicature of ‘Give me that mouse’, which is now the TT explicature. Thus what happens in the translation is actually a change of status between the ST’s explicature and implicature. This kind of exchange may be applied for various reasons in translation – for example, style, naturalness, or tone modification (see Murtisari 2011). This phenomenon, however, is not addressed in the traditional approach of explicitation/implicitation (e.g. Larson 1984; Gutt 2000). In the above example from the translation of Of Mice and Men, for instance, the shift would only be described as a case of explicitation of the meaning implication of ‘I want that mouse’.

4.5 Translation of Figurative Expressions

Following Carston’s ad hoc concepts, we shall treat shifts involving figurative expressions in a very non-literal manner. Here the “immediate” non-literal meaning of the figurative form is seen as explicature because it is still an enrichment of the form within the context. Consider the following example:

(19)

ST: Laki-laki itu memang kepala batu.
   ‘the man is indeed bull-headed’

TT: The man is very stubborn indeed.

In this hypothetical translation, the ST figurative expression, kepala batu (lit. ‘stone-headed’) ‘bull-headed’ is replaced by its content meaning, ‘very stubborn’. This is a
scalar explicitation because the TT is still a development of the ST's logical form.\footnote{This view is different from Grice’s (1967) approach, which would see the translation (TT) in example (20) as an implicature resulting from deliberate violation of the Maxim of Quality (Do not convey what you believe to be false or unjustified). It is obviously a lie that a man could have a head made of stone or have a bull-head and therefore the speaker must urge the hearer to seek an interpretation beyond this literal meaning.} Now compare this with the following example:

(20)

\begin{tabular}{l}
ST: Laki-laki itu memang \textit{kepala batu}. \\
& ‘the man is indeed \textit{bull-headed}’ \\
TT: The man is bull-headed. He never listens to anyone, no matter what.
\end{tabular}

In this latter rendering, the source form ‘the man is indeed bull-headed’ is maintained and a new piece of information ‘he never listens to anyone, no matter what’ is added. This strategy of addition may be considered “categorical”, because it has shifted the status of the meaning to a different category, an explicature.

In translation, it is not an uncommon practice to replace a piece of figurative language with one of its implicatures. Like in many cases of categorical explicitation, the rendering may also involve a categorical de-explicitation:

(21)

\begin{tabular}{l}
ST: Laki-laki itu memang \textit{kepala batu}. \\
& ‘the man is indeed \textit{bull-headed}’ \\
TT: The man never listens to anyone, no matter what.
\end{tabular}

The above translation only explicates an implicature of the ST instead of developing its explicate, which is a categorical explicitation. However, the meaning ‘the man is indeed bull-headed/very stubborn’ is not entirely lost. It is still preserved as an implicature by the meaning ‘the man never listens to anyone, no matter what’. The translation therefore also involves a categorical de-explicitation because the meaning has shifted its status from an explicate to an implicature.

4.6 Meaning Modifications and mistranslations

“Meaning modification” can be defined as translation shifts in which the particular meaning of the TT is not immediately based on an obvious interpretation of the ST, i.e. it is neither a development of the logical form of the ST nor the recovery of any of its implicatures. The TT is instead modified by the translator for particular effects in the TT; for instance for stylistic reasons or cultural adaptations. “Mistranslation”, on the other hand, refers to changes of meaning in the TT that are irrelevant to the purpose of the translation, being most often due to misinterpretation rather than the application of accurate knowledge by the translator. Since meaning modifications and mistranslations
are neither a development of the logical form of the ST nor the recovery of any of its implicatures, they are distinct from explicitation/implicitation in our framework. This approach is different from that in a discourse-based account of explicitation/implicitation, which treats them as cases of explicitation/implicitation, since the TT meaning is not analysed on the basis of its relationship with the ST.

5 Conclusion

The Relevance Theory’s concepts of explication and implicature have been shown to have the ability to bring different aspects of explicitation and implicitation together under the typology of scalar and categorical explicitation/de-explicitation. This new approach combines both textual and meaning-level explicitness and their related categories of shifts, the traditional textual and meaning-level explicitation/implicitation, while still treating the meaning relationship of the ST and TT as an essential element of the shifts. Shifts of meanings that are not related to the ST are treated as a separate category, thus providing a finer distinction for the description of meaning shifts in translation.

Explicitation and de-explicitation are a resource for the translator in rebuilding and reshaping the communication cues for the target reader in relation to the shifting context. In this process, the translator’s interpretation not only involves the elaboration of meaning at the word or phrase level within the explication (scalar shifts), but it also sometimes involves deductive inferences at the level of the source utterance (categorical shifts). When the additional information does not involve the development of single logical forms of the source text, it will not be comparable with the source text in terms of its level of informativity.

References

Carston, Robyn (1995): “Quantity Maxims and Generalised Implicature.” Lingua 96 [4]: 213-244


A Relevance-based Framework for Explicitation and Implicitation in Translation: An Alternative Typology


Author
Elisabet Titik Murtisari is a lecturer at the Faculty of Language and Literature, Satya Wacana Christian University, Central Java, Indonesia. She obtained her master’s degree in Translation Studies (Applied Linguistics) from the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra, in 2005, and her PhD in the same field from Monash University, Melbourne, in 2011.
E-mail: etmurtisari@yahoo.com.au
Website: [http://satyawacanachristianu.academia.edu/ElisabetMurtisari](http://satyawacanachristianu.academia.edu/ElisabetMurtisari)
Buchempfehlungen von Frank & Timme

FFF: Forum für Fachsprachen-Forschung
Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Hartwig Kalverkämper


TRANSÜD. Arbeiten zur Theorie und Praxis des Übersetzens und Dolmetschens
Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Klaus-Dieter Baumann, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Hartwig Kalverkämper, Prof. Dr. Klaus Schubert

Silke Jansen/Martina Schrader-Kniffki (eds.): La traducción a través de los tiempos, espacios y disciplinas. 366 páginas. ISBN 978-3-86596-524-0.


TTT: Transkulturalität – Translation – Transfer
Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Dörte Andres, Dr. Martina Behr, Prof. Dr. Larisa Schippel, Dr. Cornelia Zwischenberger


Sie wollen gute Bücher faire Preise wir bieten beides.

Frank & Timme
Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Wittelsbacherstraße 27a, D-10707 Berlin
Telefon (030) 88 66 79 11, Fax (030) 88 39 87 31
info@frank-timme.de, www.frank-timme.de